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BOOK REVIEW
WILLIAM REHNQUIST AS HISTORIAN
CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876. By William H.
Rehnquist. Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. Pp. 288. $26.00.
CENTENNIAL

ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME.

By William H.

Rehnquist. Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. Pp. 277. $27.50.
GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL

By William H. Rehnquist.
Quill William Morrow, New York, 1992. Pp. 303. $23.00.
CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON.

Mark Tushnett
INTRODUCTION

Whenever I see that a federal judge has published a book, I wonder whether we are paying ourjudges too little or too much: too little,
perhaps, because they find it necessary to supplement their incomes
with book royalties, such as they are; too much, perhaps, because they
plainly do not find that the work we give them fills their time. On
reflection, however, I realize that my initial reaction rests on too narrow a view of the job our judges have. They are, of course, adjudicators, law appliers, and lawmakers, but they are also civic educators.1
The books they write are one of the modes in which they perform the
2
latter aspect of their job.
But that conclusion leads to another question: How good are federal judges at educating the public through writing books? There are
reasons to be skeptical, arising primarily from the strong possibility of
sycophantism. One of the perks of being a judge is that people call
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
t
Center.
1 For an analysis of the federal judge's role as civic educator in the early republic, see
Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 128.
2 This understanding alleviates another concern I have about the propriety of using
public resources to support public employees' activities that generate additional personal
income. Sometimes public employees donate royalties to charity, which addresses this concern (though not, in my view, completely). ChiefJustice Rehnquist indicated that his secretaries assisted in producing his books. I do not know whether he paid them some
additional salary to do so, nor do I know whether he donated whatever royalties he received. But to the extent that his books are part of his role as a civic educator, these
concerns disappear: He is using public resources to perform part of his public job.
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you "Your Honor" and stand up when you enter the room. Books by
federal judges are likely to be assigned for review to "interested" parties-lawyers who imagine themselves arguing cases before the judge
in question or encountering the judge in a social situation, or journalists who report on the courts and need to maintain access to their
sources. This minimizes the possibility of receiving bad reviews, which
in turn reduces the incentives a judge has to write a truly good book.
Under the circumstances, then, one might expect extracurial judicial writing to be something like-to borrow from Samuel Johnson-a dog's walking on its hind legs; it might not be done well, but
one is surprised that it is done at all. 3 This Review examines Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's three books of popular history. I do not
intend to provide summaries of them, beyond this: Grand Inquests is
about the impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase in 1804-05 and of
President AndrewJohnson in 1867. 4 All the Laws But One explores the
nature and consequences of the national government's response to
dissent during the Civil War, with a quick look at similar issues during
World Wars I and II. 5 Finally, Centennial Crisisconcerns the resolution
of the 1876 dispute over who was to become president after the election left uncertain which of the candidates received the majority of
6
the votes in several states.
On a job evaluation form, one would check off the box labeled
"Exceeds expectations" if asked about ChiefJustice Rehnquist's books
of popular history. They are good, though not exceptionally good. In
the remainder of this Review, I comment first on the books qua popular history, identifying some of the features of that genre and showing
how the ChiefJustice's books fit into it. Then I turn to what I call the
sensibility revealed in the books, the general cast of mind, the way the
Chief Justice approaches matters, particularly those implicating the
courts-before concluding with a discussion of the jurisprudence revealed in the books, that is, the analysis the Chief Justice offers of
specific legal propositions.
3
....

See The Samuel Johnson Sound Bite Page, Women Preaching ...
http://www.samueljohnson.com/dogwalk.html

/ Dog Walking

(last visited Mar. 24, 2006).

4
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OFJUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992).
5

WILLIAM H.

REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME

WILLIAM H.

REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876

(1998).
6

(2004). Many have observed that the Chief Justice had a talent for selecting topics that
became obviously relevant shortly after publication. Grand Inquests was published in 1992
(six years before President William Jefferson Clinton was impeached in 1998), and All the
Laws But One in 1998 (just three years before American military engagement in Afghanistan in 2001). Centennial Crisis was published in 2004, so unless the research started long
before, it did not anticipate the 2000 election debacle.
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WILLIAM REHNQUIST AS HISTORIAN
I
WILLIAM REHNQUIST AS POPULAR

HISTORIAN

Works of popular history usually begin with some striking incident, usually captured in a dramatic anecdote describing an important event in the overall story. Readers know from the outset that the
incident and event are significant, but the author assumes that they do
not know exactly why. The popular historian moves backward from
the opening event to place the event in its historical setting, and then
forward from the incident's conclusion to show its contemporary relevance. Along the way, the author gives each new character a short
biographical and personality sketch and describes various physical locations to give readers a feel for the "past-ness" of the story. At the
end of the tale, the author tells the reader what ultimately becomes of
the main characters.
The best popular historians do original research in archives, but
many mine published sources-often, of course, old ones not readily
available to contemporary readers-and synthesize the available information into a new narrative. The best popular histories subtly make
an argument about history; rather than explicitly present a thesis
about their subject, the authors use the narrative itself to carry their
arguments. Their selection of which incidents to describe and which
characters to sketch, as well as the language they use in writing these
descriptions and sketches, operates to "make" an argument, the terms
of which the writers refrain from spelling out.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's books follow the form of good popular
history, 7 but are not among the best of this genre. His research apparently consists of reading published accounts, some of which-such as
the transcripts of the Chase and Johnson impeachments-are original
sources. Grand Inquests opens with a sketch of the commencement of
Justice Chase's impeachment trial. 8 The obligatory brief biographies
are all there-sometimes a bit pedestrian, but never long enough to
interfere with the larger story. One distinctive feature of Rehnquist's
books is hardly surprising: He periodically gives readers his views on
how certain aspects of the historic trials he discusses would be re7 One gets the sense that the Chief Justice was something of a Civil War buff. The
Civil War and its aftermath play a central role in all three books considered here, and one
might reasonably think that the discussions of the Chase impeachment in Grand Inquests
and the restrictions of civil liberties during World Wars I and II in All the Laws But One were
added to fill out pages in books the Chief Justice wished could solely be about the Civil
War.
8 See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 15-16. All the Laws But One follows this form, but in
a way that indicates some of the Chief Justice's limitations. The opening incident depicts
Abraham Lincoln's departure from Springfield, Illinois for his inauguration, but the depiction is in Carl Sandburg's words, not Rehnquist's. See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 3 (quoting 3 CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE PRIIE YEARS AND THE WAR YEARS 195
(1954)).
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solved under today's law. 9 He was, after all, the Chief Justice of the
United States.
What makes Rehnquist a good popular historian, but not a distinguished one? First, he occasionally succumbs to the temptations of
antiquarianism, recounting stories about the past because they strike
him as interesting even though they have little to do with the main
story he is presenting. Setting the context for the Civil War treason
trials in Ohio, for example, Rehnquist offers an overly extended account of how the Midwest was settled.10 More significantly, the Chief
Justice gives readers too many block quotations. These are visually
distracting, of course, but they also signal an author's reluctance to
stand behind his story by putting it in his own words.1 "
Finally, Rehnquist has not mastered the expository techniques
needed to connect the "look backward" to the narrative line going
forward. What should be a presentation merely setting the stage for
the main story is, in all three books, a longer-than-appropriate political history of the Antebellum United States. 12 Rehnquist seems to forget that he should not be giving that history to readers for its own
sake, but simply using it to explain why people were doing what they
were doing during the events at the center of the story. As a result, a
reader may occasionally wonder why she is getting excruciating detail
about politics in the 1850s when she picked up a book that was, she
thought, about 1867 or 1876.
These are imperfections, not fatal flaws. As I have said, Rehnquist
is a good popular historian, and my critical observations should be
read with that conclusion in mind.
II
WILLIAM REHNQUIST'S SENSIBILITY

Rehnquist was a popular historian, but of course he was some-

thing else as well. One can read books by Doris Kearns Goodwin with9 See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 101-02 (describing the evidentiary rules dealing
with the admissibility of hearsay testimony in conspiracy trials in his discussion of the testimony in the Indianapolis Treason Trials during the Civil War).
10
See id. at 78-80; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 128-30 (describing the physical
space provided to the Supreme Court in its early years, distracting the reader from the
main story of what Justice Chase's impeachment and eventual acquittal implied for the
Court).
See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 15-17, 30-36; REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at
11
23-24, 65-67; REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 51-54, 58-68. A related weakness appears in the
account of the trials of those accused of conspiring to assassinate President Lincoln, which
is simply an extended and quite tedious witness-by-witness summary of the testimony
presented. See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 155-61.
12 InGrand Inquests, this history is presented in connection with the impeachment of
President Andrew Johnson, and comes midway through the book. See REHNQUIST, supra
note 4, at 151-84.
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out thinking too much about what her books reveal about the way she
thinks, or what I would call her "sensibility." The sensibility displayed
by an author who was, not incidentally, the ChiefJustice of the United
States Supreme Court is an entirely different matter.
Any good author, as Rehnquist is, will not display his sensibility
too often, for that would intrude on the narrative flow. I have identified, however, two main areas in which Rehnquist does reveal his sensibility in his works of history: his attitude toward the program for
reconstruction of the South pursued by the "Radical Republicans" in
Congress, and his attitude toward (surprise) the enterprise of
13
judging.
Addressing first the subject of congressional Reconstruction,
Rehnquist seems mildly unsympathetic to Congress's aggressive efforts
to remake the defeated South. This attitude is more apparent in word
and source choice than in any explicit statement. For example, Rehnquist calls General Stephen Frfmont's order to immediately free all
slaves coming into the control of military forces under his command
"extravagant and undisciplined." 14 The characterization of the order
as "undisciplined" is certainly apt; having been issued in Missouri in
1861, the order complicated Lincoln's efforts to retain some hold
both there and in other border states where slavery had been legal.
Indeed, upon hearing of it, Lincoln directed that the order be rescinded immediately. 15 The term "extravagant," though, seems to address the substance of Fremont's order and suggests that immediate
emancipation might have been, in Rehnquist's eyes, something of a
bad idea. Similarly, Rehnquist sustains an arguably inappropriate
even-handed tone in describing potential electoral fraud in the 1876
elections, treating possible frauds committed by Republicans as
roughly equal in severity to those committed by Democrats. In so doing, he makes little of the fact that while Republicans may have stuffed
ballot boxes, Democrats terrorized black voters and potential voters in
the South. 16
Rehnquist's account of President Johnson's impeachment is also
mildly anti-Radical in tone.1 7 This may reflect the times during which
Rehnquist would have initially studied history; the historiography of
13 1 distinguish between the latter, which I refer to as Rehnquist's attitude regarding
the role ofjudges, and Rehnquist's express views on substantive issues of constitutional law,
which I refer to as the jurisprudence displayed in his books. See infra Part III.
14 REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 109.
15 See id.
16 REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 104-109.
17 See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 245-46 ("It remained for Sumner, who combined near-fanaticism with extraordinary ability, to frankly state the other view. Butjust as
one would not want to see fastened upon parliamentary proceedings, in connection with a
vote of confidence in the government, the often tedious and demanding requirements of a
judicial trial, it is very difficult to reconcile Sumner's candidly political approach with the
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Reconstruction, as it stood in the 1940s and early 1950s, was dominated by the view that congressional Reconstruction had been misguided. Strikingly, Rehnquist includes a block quotation from James
Ford Rhodes-one of the central figures in the dominant historiography of that period-on the electoral crisis of 1876,18 and Rehnquist's
principal secondary source for the story of the electoral commission
that resolved the 1876 election dispute is Charles Fairman, who was
closely aligned with the anti-Radical historians.' 9
While Rehnquist's views on Reconstruction may be of interest to
the extent that they shed some light on his views on the proper interpretation of the Radical-inspired Fourteenth Amendment, Rehnquist's books display his sensibilities about judges more openly and
extensively.
It should come as no surprise that Rehnquist likes judges. 20 Interestingly, however, he does not systematically distinguish the judges
as individuals from the courts on which they sit. For example, in
describing Congress's reliance on Supreme CourtJustices to sit on the
1876 Electoral Commission, he observes that "[i]t was quite natural
21
for Congress to turn to the justices of the Supreme Court ....
Rehnquist does not make much of the fact that it was widely anticipated that four of the Justices named to the Commission were predictably going to vote along party lines, and that only Justice David Davis
was expected to assess the situation with any degree of independence;
Justice Davis, however, never served on the Commission, because he
was elected to the Senate before the Commission met.2 2 He was re23
placed by Justice Joseph Bradley, an ardent Republican partisan.

constitutional provisions dealing with impeachment. This, at any rate, was the view of
those recusant Republicans who filed opinions in the case.").
See REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 109.
18
19 Rehnquist relies on Fairman's book on the electoral commission, FiveJustices and
the Electoral Commission of 1877, which was published in 1988, the year Fairman died. See id.
at ix ("I dedicate this book to Charles Fairman, who first introduced me to the Supreme
Court in an undergraduate course in Constitutional Law at Stanford University."). Both
Pamela Brandwein and Richard Primus have suggested a connection between Fairman's
interpretation of Reconstruction and Rehnquist's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 2-3 (1999) (examining the interactions between competing histories of Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment); Richard A.
Primus, JudicialPower and Mobilizable History, 65 MD. L. REv. 171 (2006).
20
Mostly. He refers to Justice Frank Murphy as "nearly messianic" and opines that, in
contrast, Justice Wiley Rutledge was "less fervent, more scholarly." REHNQUIST, supra note
5, at 195. Again, it is Rehnquist's word choices that matter: messianism and fervency counterposed to scholarliness.
21
REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 119. Since the limitations imposed by Article III precluded the justices from acting qua judges on the Commission, the justices served in their
individual capacities. See id.
See id. at 141-42.
22
23
See id. at 159.
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And at that point, at least in the eyes of contemporaries, partisanship
fatally infected the Commission, as everyone expected that Justice
Bradley would resolve all disputed questions in favor of the Republi24
can candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes. As indeed he did.

Rehnquist goes to some lengths to defend Justice Bradley against
the charge, raised decades after the fact, that he had changed his conclusions favoring Democrat Samuel Tilden to favoring Hayes after a
midnight visit from Republican activists. 25 Invoking Justice Bradley's

reputation for integrity, Rehnquist suggests-but does not explicitly
say-that Justice Bradley's factual conclusions were at least defensible. 26 Putting aside the problem of Democratic terrorism in South

Carolina and Florida, however, the facts seem to be on Tilden's side.
What is striking is that Rehnquist, while confronting a particular
charge of essentially corrupt behavior, makes little of what I would
think is the deeper issue of judicial partisanship.
What emerges from Rehnquist's treatment of these issues is the
sense that he viewed judges, by virtue of their offices, as presumptively
honest and above the fray.2 7 In subtly communicating this view, Rehnquist often sets up a dichotomy between honest conduct and corrupt
conduct so that he can refute the contention that a particular judge
acted corruptly on a particular occasion, leaving it to the reader to
infer that the judge was basically honest. Rehnquist seems systematically to ignore the possibility that some intermediate position, such as
inappropriate partisanship, provides a more accurate assessment. For
example, discussing the impeachment charges against Justice Samuel
Chase, Rehnquist writes that "the evidence adduced at the trial before
the Senate showed that Chase was impatient, overbearing, and at
times arrogant, but this falls short of showing that Chase was actually
28
the malevolent figure that [Raoul] Berger makes him out to be."
In discussing the Court's about-face in the Legal Tender cases,
Rehnquist again defends justices against criticism. In that line of
cases, a short-handed Court first held, by a four-to-three vote, that
Congress lacked the power to make paper money legal tender. 2 9 Following that decision, President Ulysses Grant nominated two justices
to fill the existing vacancies. 30 The constitutional issue then returned
24
25
26

See id. at 172-75, 180.
See id. at 194-200.
See id.
27
For an important qualification, see infra text accompanying notes 59-68, 73-74
(discussing Rehnquist's observation that, as a positive matter, courts are likely to do relatively little to stand in the way of executive initiatives during wartime).
28
REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 88. Rehnquist clearly disapproved of Berger's book,
Impeachment: The ConstitutionalProblem, which advocated that the Senate should have convicted Justice Chase and removed him from office. See id.
29 See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 624-25 (1870).

30

See REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 129-30.
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to the Court a year later, but this time the constitutionality of Congress issuing paper money was upheld by a five-to-four vote. 3 1 Charles
Evans Hughes, who knew something about the Supreme Court, called
the reversal of position one of the Supreme Court's "self-inflicted
wounds. '32 Not so, Rehnquist writes: "There were public complaints
that Grant had deliberately named the two new justices in order to
33
reverse the first decision, but this is not borne out by the facts.1
Rehnquist provides no support for the latter assertion, but the important point is that here too he resorts to dichotomy. He characterizes
the popular opinion of Grant's choices as "deliberate" and specifically
motivated by knowledge of what the nominees would do. Presumably,
this is counterposed to another, polar-opposite motive-"complete indifference," perhaps-without acknowledging that there might be an
intermediate position, such as a "confident expectation" of how the
nominees would decide the issue, that might have more accurately
34
captured the reality of the events.
In Centennial Crisis's epilogue, Rehnquist discusses the impact of
the Hays-Tilden controversy on modern-day developments and
presents a mild defense ofJustices who serve in a public but nonjudicial capacity.3 5 In Rehnquist's view, judges are intellectual elites to
whom the American people turn when serious problems arise, which
is, Rehnquist thinks, basically a good thing. Rehnquist refers to the
Supreme Court's "rightful place as the head of the third branch of the
federal government,"3 6 and it is hard to read this as limited to the
Court's position vis-A-vis other, lower federal courts. In All the Laws
But One, he is more explicit. Comparing the treatment of dissent during the Civil War and World War I, he writes, "Though the courts
during [World War I] gave little relief to civil liberties claimants, the
very fact that the claims were being reviewed by the judiciary was a
31
See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 569-70 (1871). For a short description of the cases,
see Gerald T. Dunne, Legal Tender Cases, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 575-76 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
32

CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDA-

TION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS-AN INTERPRETATION 50 (1928).

33
REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 129-30.
34 Indeed, other presidents have been documented proponents ofjust such a middle
position, as reflected by Abraham Lincoln's statement, widely quoted in the context of
modem Supreme Court nominations, that "[w]e cannot ask a man what he will do, and if
we should, and he should answer us, we should despise him for it. Therefore we must take
a man whose opinions are known." Charles Fairman, Mr.Justice Bradley's Appointment to the
Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1128, 1142 (1941) (citing 2
GEORGE BoUTwELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS 29 (1902)).

35 It is worth noting that that is the topic Rehnquist uses to conclude the book, rather
than, for example, a consideration of Congress's enactment of the Electoral Count Act, a
statute that the Supreme Court basically ignored in deciding Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98

(2000).
36

REHNQUIST,

supra note 6, at 132.
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step in the right direction for proponents of civil liberties during wartime. '37 This observation serves as a transition to my consideration of
the jurisprudence Rehnquist reveals in his books, because the "rightful place" the courts occupy is, it turns out, rather small in compass.
III
WILLIAM REHNQUIST'S JURISPRUDENCE

FOR A POPULAR AUDIENCE

Of course, the place scholars go to find out what a justice thinks
about the law is the U.S. Reports, with some visits, perhaps, to the
justice's writings for academic audiences. Rehnquist's books could
not contain much, and certainly nothing systematic, about his constitutional vision without reducing their quality as popular histories.
Even so, and perhaps because Rehnquist does not avoid the risks of
self-indulgence I mentioned in the Introduction, one can find some
expressions of his constitutional jurisprudence in these books. I
found two such expressions particularly striking: Rehnquist's passing
comments on one aspect of the Chase impeachment, and his more
extended comments on the likely role of judges responding to civil
liberties claims during wartime.
Some of the charges against Justice Chase arose from his actions
during the treason trial of John Fries, who had assembled an armed
force to resist the collection of a federal property tax. 38 For all practical purposes, the only issue in the treason trial was the legal question
of whether armed resistance to a single federal law constituted "levying war" against the United States, or whether the offense required
resistance to such a wide range of laws as to amount to a more general
repudiation of the authority of the government.3 9 The impeachment
charges againstJustice Chase stemmed from his approach to that issue
at trial, both procedurally and substantively, with the House alleging
thatJustice Chase had predetermined the substantive question before
hearing any argument from Fries's lawyers.
Fries had already been tried and convicted of treason, but was
granted a new trial when the original conviction was vacated on
grounds of potential juror bias. 40 Upon arriving to preside over the
retrial, Justice Chase observed that, in his view, too much time at the
first trial had been wasted in arguments over the meaning of the Trea-

37
38

39

40

supra note 5, at 182.
See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 60.
See id. at 61.
See id.
REHNQUIST,
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son Clause. 4 1 Accordingly, Justice Chase had prepared and distributed an opinion expressing "the proper definition of treason" to
guide the parties during the retrial, which he also used to instruct the
jury. 4 2 Fries's lawyers objected vigorously to this "prejudged opinion"
and withdrew in protest. 43 Faced with the allegation (later echoed in
the impeachment proceedings) that he had improperly denied Fries
and his lawyers the opportunity to argue for their contrary interpretation of the Treason Clause, Justice Chase retreated. 44 The next time
the court sat, Justice Chase offered to let Fries's lawyers present their
arguments. 45 Not surprisingly, Fries's lawyers thought this unlikely to
be an adequate remedy for an apparent prejudgment, and declined
46
the invitation.
On this question, Rehnquist is sympathetic to Justice Chase, and
concludes that while he made "at most an error of judgment, [it was]
...surely not a ground for removal from office." 4 7 By summarily exonerating Chase in this manner, however, Rehnquist effectively dismisses the substantive issues that the impeachment charges raised,
and thus fails to adequately communicate to his readers what was at
stake. As modern scholarship has shown, there was a significant dispute in the early Republic over where the final authority for constitutional interpretation was lodged. Some placed that authority in the
courts. Others argued that the people-serving as jurors-had that
authority. Advocates for the latter position argued that in order to
exercise this interpretive authority successfully, the people should be
informed by arguments from the lawyers for the contending parties,
and not-at least according to some-by the judges who were their
servants. 48 It was in the context of this national debate that Fries's
lawyers, and later the House, objected to Justice Chase's initial opinion on two substantive grounds: First, he should not have offered his
own interpretation of the Treason Clause in his charge to the jury;
second, he improperly precluded Fries's lawyers from arguing their
own interpretation to the jury.
41
See id. at 63 (notingJustice Chase's opinion that at the first trial "there had been a
great waste of time in making long speeches on topics that had nothing to do with the
business at hand").
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 66.
46 See id. at 64. Obviously unsatisfied, Fries's lawyers questioned: "You have withdrawn
the papers; but can you eradicate from your own mind[ ] the opinion which you have
formed ... ?" Id.
47 See id. at 73.
48 The most important recent exposition of the arguments is LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004), but the
controversy was laid out in the literature on the early Republic many years before. See, e.g.,
Lerner, supra note 1.

2006]

WILLIAM REHNQUIST AS HISTORIAN

Rehnquist addresses only the second of these objections, concluding that the evidence did not support the charge. 49 Rehnquist's
finding is based largely on one witness's testimony that Justice Chase
had stated, with apparent impatience, that Fries's lawyers were "at liberty to proceed as [they thought] proper, [and to] address the jury
and lay down the law as [they thought] proper."50 Other evidence
reported by Rehnquist, however, renders the scenario a bit more ambiguous. For example, Justice Chase also. said that the lawyers could
"proceed as they chose, .

.

. 'but it is at the hazard of your charac-

ters.' "51 In light of Justice Chase's reputed temper, arrogance, and
heavy-handedness,5 2 the lawyers might well have believed that his invitation to argue the law to the jury was insincere.
The other substantive issue-whether Justice Chase should have
offered his interpretation of the Treason Clause to the jury-is more
important, and Rehnquist seems not to notice it. After Justice Chase
withdrew his initial opinion and indicated that Fries's lawyers could
present their arguments on the meaning of the Treason Clause,
Fries's lead counsel replied, "I will never address the court on a criminal case on a question of law." 5 3 To the modern ear this is an extremely puzzling statement; yet Rehnquist does not appear to notice
its oddity. Instead, Rehnquist proceeds to describe the modern practice for developing jury charges, which of course typically does involve arguments to the court by the defendants' lawyers. 54 The critical
question is therefore left unaddressed: What on earth could Fries's
lawyer have meant by saying that he would never argue the law to a
judge?
The witness who reported the statement noted that it had been
made "with considerable emphasis." 5 5 Where might the emphasis
have been placed? On the words "the court." Essentially, Fries's
counsel declared, "I will never address the court on a criminal case on a
question of law," because he would have believed that the court itself
had no authority to interpret the law. Implicitly, the lawyer was asserting that he would address the jury, and only the jury, on such ques-

49

See REHNQUIST, supra note 4, at 73.

See id. at 66, 73.
Id. at 64.
52
As one federal district judge paired with Justice Chase observed: "I never sat with
him without pain, as he was forever getting into some intemperate and unnecessary squabble." Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
53
Id. at 66.
54 See id. at 69 ("In my own practice of law in Arizona ... every judge would decide
questions of law. .. ").
55
See id. at 66.
50
51
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tions. 56 This argument would be mystifying in a modem court, and so
Rehnquist's readers would have been better served had he explained
or even noted it.
The reason Rehnquist does not do so is, I think, obvious enough:
Rehnquist is very much ajudicial supremacist. For Rehnquist, of course
judges, and only judges, interpret the law. Rehnquist has repeatedly
joined and written opinions defending the supremacy of the judiciary. 57 That Rehnquist is ajudicial supremacist, however, should come
as no surprise. What makes the treatment ofjudicial supremacy in his
books so interesting is how unselfconscious his assumption of it is.
Most discussions of All the Laws But One usually and understandably focus on Rehnquist's comments on the judicial role during wartime,5 8 but they have overlooked a few of the more interesting points
in his treatment of the subject. One is a simple tension between his
apparent endorsement of some judicial intervention on behalf of civil
liberties and the doubts reflected in his attempts to articulate a doctrinal formulation for that role. 59 I have already referred to the former,
in Rehnquist's mention of the "generally ameliorative trend" in judicial decisions dealing with wartime dissent.60 The latter point, however, is more subtle. In discussing the Japanese internment cases,
Rehnquist describes the suggestion by Eugene Rostow that the courts
examine "the entire question of military necessity" as "an extraordinarily dubious proposition."' 6 1 His reason is the simple proposition that
courts are "ill-suited to determine an issue such as 'military

necessity.'

"62

Unless we put a great deal of weight on the word "entire" in Rostow's proposal, though, Rehnquist's skepticism about judicial capacity
undermines the possibility of judicial review fairly substantially. For,
in every war-related case implicating civil liberties, the government's
claim is, or at least can easily be, that any given restriction on civil
56 Indeed, immediately prior to this declaration, Fries's counsel stated that "the prisoner's counsel have a right to make a full defense, and [to] address the jury both on the
law and on the facts." See id. (emphasis added).
57 See, e.g.,
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution."); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say
what the law is.").
58 See, e.g., Norman Provizer, Rehnquist Tackles a Tough Question, RocKy MOUNTAIN
NEWS (DENVER), Jan. 3, 1999, at 3E (reviewing All the Laws But One and noting that Rehnquist advocates a more restricted judicial role during wartime without inquiring exactly
what Rehnquist's proposed limitations are).
59 See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 221-25.
60
See id. at 221.
61

Id. at 205.

62 Id. (citing courts' "restrictive rules of evidence, orientation towards resolution of
factual disputes in individual cases, and long delays").
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liberties is justified by military necessity. How can a court that is unable to evaluate claims of military necessity ever decide that such a re63
striction is unjustified?
Rehnquist's treatment of the maxim, Inter arma silent leges (in
times of war, the law falls silent) -also the tide of the brief concluding
chapter of All the Laws But One--has a curiously detached tone. 64 As
previously noted, Rehnquist seems to endorse some degree ofjudicial
intervention on behalf of civil liberties and seems to take comfort in
the increasing role played by the courts in that arena from the Civil
War through World War J1.65 However, he also notes, seemingly approvingly, that the courts were truly interventionist only after war had
ended. 66 He ultimately appears to say, though only indirectly, that
judicial intervention during wartime should be avoided:
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper
balance between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of
order-in favor of the government's ability to deal with conditions
that threaten the national well-being. it simply cannot be said,
therefore, that in every conflict between individual liberty and gov67
ernmental authority the former should prevail.
Rehnquist seems more committed to a different, and in some ways
more interesting, proposition than the one endorsed in that passage,
however. This is apparent in his declaration that despite its age, the
Inter arma silent leges principle "[still] has validity at least in a descrip63
I should note, simply for completeness, the possibility that there may be some truly
absolute constitutional protections of civil liberties of a sort that no claim of military necessity would be sufficient to override. Until recently, the example would have been a constitutional prohibition on torture, but we have now learned that some lawyers take seriously
the contention that torture can sometimes be justified by military necessity. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (concluding that Congress lacks the power to
make it a criminal offense for an executive official to torture detainees, and that an official
would have a defense of "necessity" in any criminal prosecution for doing so).
It is worth observing that the Supreme Court of Israel, while formally disclaiming the
power to reject assertions by military officials that certain actions were required by military
necessity, has actually engaged in fairly intrusive examinations of such assertions and has in
some instances rejected them. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr.
[2004] IsrSC 46(2) 150, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files-eng/04/560/020/
a28/04020560.a28.pdf (requiring the Israeli military to reconsider the proposed route of a
separation fence, security considerations notwithstanding).
64
See REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 218.
65
See id. at 221.
66
See id. at 221-22.
67
Id. at 222-23. I doubt that anyone has ever seriously contended that "in every conflict" individual liberty should prevail. This is another example of the trope Rehnquist is
fond of-the creation of polarities rather than continua.
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tive way," 6 8 thus drawing an implicit contrast with its possible invalidity
in a normative sense.
A historian or sociologist might, of course, easily say that as a historical or sociological matter the inter arma phrase is descriptively accurate. But when a judge says so, even in a work of popular history,
the judge's attitude toward his own assertion is more complex. The
historian and sociologist, after all, have no professional obligation to
make the laws. Rehnquist's narrow focus on the descriptive accuracy
of the phrase brings to mind Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous descriptive theory of law: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 69
While such prophecies might be appropriate for lawyers advising their
70
clients, a judge must decide what the law is.

Viewed in that light, Rehnquist's claim about the phrase's descriptive accuracy may make sense from a point of view external to the
courts, but it cannot be reconciled with the so-called internal point of
view of a sitting chiefjustice. Put simply, Rehnquist seems to be saying
that as a matter of brute fact, you cannot expect that he and his colleagues will do the right thing, which is to protect civil liberties during
wartime. To which there is an obvious response: The Court will have
choices to make when the issues are presented, and what principled
reason exists to undermine the public's expectation that the Justices-whom Rehnquist believes are the proper arbiters of at least
some contentious societal questions 7 1-will make the right decisions?
Rehnquist might appear to take at least some of the sting out of
his focus on descriptive accuracy in the last sentences of All the Laws
But One.
[I] t is both desirable and likely that more careful attention will be
paid by the courts to the basis for the government's claims of necessity as a basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws will thus not be
silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different
72
voice.
Nevertheless, I am not sure that he succeeds in defusing the concern
that civil liberties will be ignored in times of war, and not simply because of his previous suggestion that courts cannot assess claims of
military necessity. 73 To some extent, Rehnquist here relies on the observation that courts are likely to be more aggressive once wars have
ended, but in that case he is not truly describing what happens "in
68

Id. at 224.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
The usual observation is that ajudge cannot coherently answer the question, "What
law is applicable to this case?," by predicting what he or she will do.
71
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
72
REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 225.
73
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69
70
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time of war." As to what happens in wartime, he really does not offer
anything to set against the descriptive claims he has made, leaving the
normative question about what he and his colleagues should do
unanswered.
CONCLUSION

William Rehnquist's works of popular history turn out to be both
better and more revealing than I had initially expected. They are
workmanlike examples of the genre-what publishers would refer to
as "midlist" books had they been written by anyone else-but not truly
distinguished ones. They also show something about Rehnquist the
jurist. By calling attention to his court-centeredness, his rather undifferentiated defense ofjudges as such, and, most significantly, his skepticism about both the ability of courts to do much in the way of
protecting civil liberties and the desirability of having them do SO,74
his books provide a valuable insight into an enormously influential
judicial philosophy.

74
I have in mind both the position taken on civil liberties during wartime in All the
Laws But One and the skepticism about radical Reconstruction apparent in his other works.
See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 5 (expressing general doubt concerning dramatic judicial action); REHNQUIST, supra note 6 (same); REHNQUIST, supra note 4 (same).
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